Policy Briefs

Policy Brief No. 76-20 | ANIDS:  An Optimal Governance Model

Oseloka H. Obaze, Chinelo Ofoche & Izuchukwu J. Okoye


ABSTRACT: This policy brief and public policy assessment paper focuses on the Anambra State Integrated Development Strategy (ANIDS) – a novel, homegrown public policy and governance template and its trajectory and developmental strategies. In the main, ANIDS derived its impetus from the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).The paper explores what made ANIDS a policy framework deployed in Anambra State Nigeria between 2008 and 2014, a unique, expansive, efficacious, and remarkable tool of governance worthy of emulation and replication elsewhere.

ANIDS was unique in that it provided a sense of ownership of the projects by carrying along project beneficiaries – the 177 communities in Anambra State – while framing the State’s annual budget, policy adoption platform and service delivery modalities. Also there was a sense of transparency, inclusion, and unfettered interface between the government and the governed, Furthermore, ANIDS allowed for participatory approaches, resource management, appraisal and utilization, based on prioritization and needs of the various communities. ANIDS benefited immensely from the adoption of results-based budgeting, needs and evidence-based policies, performance evaluation linked to budgets, and peer reviews that focused on fiscal transparency, accountability, capability and sustainability, consistent with European Union’s State Partnership for Accountability, Responsiveness and Capability (SPARC) as well as World Bank standards. Finally it was determined that ANIDS guaranteed broad feedback, undergirded by documented experiences, challenges, setbacks, missed opportunities and lessons learned, while offering a veritable basis for external parties, mainly investors, donors, and development partners to freely and openly evaluate government policies, programmes and projects carried out under the governance model. ANIDS was not by any means a perfect governance model. The template lacked a component that guaranteed continuity in governance (CiG). This arose mainly because ANIDS as a policy framework was bereft of legislative backing. Nonetheless, this study concludes that adaptive and good leadership, credibility of policy and a seamless implementation of policies, programmes and projects in a transparent manner, made all the difference, while ANIDS provided institutional architecture and implementation modalities.  

 Keywords: Accountability, Budgetary Forum, Community Resilience, Fiscal Transparency, Integrated Development Strategy, Millennium Development Goals, Participatory Governance, Peter Obi, Tiers of Government, Anambra State Integrated Development Strategy, ANIDS, Sustainability, Development Partners, Development Strategy, Good Governance, Nigeria, Palliatives, Public Policy, Results-based budgeting. 



ANIDS – genesis, strategy definition, and conception.

1. It is a commonly shared view that government administrations come and go, leaving behind successful or failed public policies. In Africa and Nigeria, the latter is often the case, thus affirming the observation that “the process of translating policy into actions often attracts greater attention because translation has been reported to lag behind policy expectations.”1  Hence, when a policy framework performs optimally and as envisaged, it seems an aberration. Moreover, when novel policy framework is introduced, such policies are initially considered by some with caution, if not deep skepticism. In the event that a new framework is introduced and succeeds, perhaps beyond expectations or beyond the traditional benchmarks, the tendency is for that policy to become a subject of curiosity and indeed, one deserving of analytical assessment. That evidently has been the fate of the Anambra Integrated Development Strategy (ANIDS), a policy framework introduced in early 2008, by Governor Peter Obi, of Anambra State, Nigeria which remained in place until the end of his administration on 17 March, 2014.


2. The Anambra Integrated Development Strategy (ANIDS) was a novel, but imaginative governance special purpose vehicle (SPV), articulated and developed by Governor Peter Obi of Anambra State in 2006 and commenced in 2008. It was envisaged as a means of providing good governance, and unlocking access to the state’s development potentials. Those who were present on the ANIDS’ creation day and as such privy to the reason-behind the thinking, offered this rationale; “Governor Peter Obi had explained that he embraced the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) after carefully studying and understanding that the MDGs initiative was a well-structured and people oriented programme whose multi-sectoral goals had the capacity to address the development needs of the people in virtually every sector of the state economy, so it was expedient to adopt the MDGs as the State’s Vision and quickly get on with the task of development, rather than trying to ‘reinvent the wheel.’” It should, therefore, be understood that aligning ANIDS to the MDGs was not a whimsical act, but a calculated policy preference. Considered differently, ANIDS was the process of domesticating the core values of the MDGs in Anambra State.


3. At the inception point of ANIDS, Anambra State with an estimated population of 4.7 million was the eight most populous state in Nigeria and the second most densely populated. The bulk of Anambra population some 2.5 million people were aged between 15-64 years (60.5%), with the youth accounting for 1.1 million of that grouping. The gender ratio was 50.7% males and 49.3% females. Its most densely populated local government area was Ihiala LGA with 302,277 people and the lowest was Dunukofia LGA with 96,517 people. Over sixty percent (60%) of its population resided in urban areas. Anambra State was not an oil producing state, and thus relied wholly on federal allocations and its internally generated revenue (IGR) for economic survival and development. In articulating ANIDS as a governance concept, Governor Peter Obi said, “our vision is to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015 as stipulated by all the 192 United Nations member states and at least 23 international agencies using our internally designed strategy, the Anambra Integrated Development Strategy (ANIDS).  


4. The Millennium Development Goals was a globally adopted governance and development blueprint signed at the Millennium Summit in September 2000, by which world leaders committed to combat poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, environmental degradation, and discrimination against women. The Eight Millennium Development Goals, which have clearly delineated targets and indicators were:

1. to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger;

2. to achieve universal primary education;

3. to promote gender equality and empower women;

4. to reduce child mortality;

5. to improve maternal health;

6. to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases;

7. to ensure environmental sustainability; and

8. to develop a global partnership for development.


5. In adopting the MDGs as the guiding framework for ANIDS, the Anambra State Government consciously subscribed to the MDGs timelines, benchmarks and overall trajectory, and specifically for ANIDS to also achieve by 2015, measurable targets for combating poverty, disease, hunger, illiteracy, environmental degradation, and discrimination against women. In its Vision and Mission statement, Anambra State declared its alignment of ANIDS to the MDGs thus: “Because these goals are multi-sectoral in nature, the State Government has adopted a unique and equally multi-sectoral approach to achieving the goals. The approach is called Anambra Integrated Development Strategy.” Indeed, it was broadly acknowledged that “establishing the MDGs [has] had a positive impact on the international development agenda” as it “enabled bilateral and multilateral actors in the international development community and aid recipient governments to move away from the narrow macro-economic stability focus of the Washington Consensus, typified by SAPS, towards a more multidimensional view of human development.” Moreover, the “multidimensional focus of MDGs [has] encouraged attention to be focused on a range of dimensions of poverty, including building capabilities such as education, health, water and sanitation.”


6. Giving effect to such noble objectives required domesticating the core values of MDGs. As the Oxford Business Group would recollect, “In 2008 Obi’s administration launched the state’s economic master plan titled the Anambra Integrated Development Strategy (ANIDS). The plan modeled after the U.N. Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), aims to achieve visible and sustainable development that will touch all sectors of the state’s economy. ANIDS mainly seeks to improve the quality of living for the citizens of Anambra, focusing on raising education and health indicators in the state. The strategy aims to transition the state’s economy from supply-driven to the demand-driven model for budget planning and implementation.” To give impetus to its objective, the government went further to engage stakeholders from all levels of the society, including traditional rulers, organized private sector (OPS), formalized and structured town unions, which represented the fourth tier of government, and international development partners to help implement the strategy. This disposition dovetailed well into the idea that “in governance, policymaking should enjoy priority, while the faithful implementation of public policies should seek to retain their primal kicks at all times.”  


7. It was thus on record, that in Nigeria, Anambra State became “the first state to involve its citizens and traditional rulers in a budget forum aimed at crafting results-based budgeting.” Thus ANIDS became for Governor Peter Obi’s administration in 2008, the optimal special purpose vehicle for achieving that objective. It was a policy that would be pursued aggressively, the administration having lost a seven-year lead and head time since the adoption of the MDGS in 2000. What other countries and states had fifteen years to accomplish, Anambra State was pushing to accomplish in seven years – by 2014, which was the end date of the Peter Obi administration, assuming he secured a second term in office.


ANIDS ~ extant alternative policy framework and challenges

8. As conceptualized, Anambra Integrated Development Strategy (ANIDS) was a planning and budgeting strategy, which allowed the Government to plan, monitor the implementation, and receive feedback from the people. ANIDS was the driving force behind the rapid development agenda during the Peter Obi administration when it was envisaged that all sectors would be developed simultaneously. In various ways, the adoption of the ANIDS framework helped on fostering policy coherence, coordination and problem solving. ANIDS also enabled the Government to identify and finance budgeting gaps through collaboration with a wide variety of partners such as community stakeholders, federal parastatals, UNDP, UNICEF, EU, DFID, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and the World Bank.


9. In an era rife with political and governance sloganeering, the conceptualization and introduction of ANIDS might have well been another cynical effort to foist a policy framework meant to suede observers that the government of the day was seriously at work. Evaluation of policy framework options was not a new academic field or one bereft of efforts or dearth of analysis. There existed a surfeit of papers and academic excursions into why policy frameworks are either successful or fail; and why some are preferred over others, given domestic peculiarities and theoretical and practical realities. From available record, ANIDS fundamentally sought to improve the living standards, quality of life of the citizens of Anambra State, with healthcare delivery and education being the primary focus areas. Yet, it could not have escaped Governor Peter Obi, that the ANIDS framework would be vigorously evaluated, if not while he was in office, then certainly in the aftermath of his leaving office. Relatedly, it ought to have occurred to him that for ANIDS to be considered among policy framework “success stories,” and therefore, gain long term validity as a good governance framework and optimal model, its results, deliverables and successes had to be sustainable and clearly documented.


10. Prevailing realities at the time ANIDS was introduced were such that the environment – in Nigeria and Anambra State – could not be considered in isolation. The policy framework itself, though particularized to Anambra State, which was one of thirty-six states in Nigeria, could also not be considered or evaluated in isolation. After all, the variables at play in Anambra were also at play in the thirty-five other states, likewise the challenges and unstable economic and political environment. If Nigeria as a country was making any attempt to create an enabling environment for its states, Anambra included, it invariably meant that some form of ‘policy coherence for development’ (PCD), was in existence. States were either to buy into such plans, or go outside the box, as Anambra did, and adopt a framework designed with their needs and particularities in mind. One fact could however not be obviated; “development paths of developing countries are influenced by a wide range of external and internal factors,” a reality that was equally applicable to a sub-nation like Anambra. As will be gleaned in the latter part of this paper, ANIDS was predicated on the attraction and retention of assistance from development partners. Such policy presumptions, though acceptable, could not be predicated on wishes and best intentions alone; but on practical and demonstrable commitment to high governance standards and receptivity of intrusive monitoring and assessment regimes, as was eventually achieved by Anambra State with U.K. DFID’s State Partnership for Accountability, Response and capacity Programme (SPARC).  


11. Contextually, there were other challenges. Public policy and public administration experts, researchers, and pundits who were predisposed to different models of developmental theoretical framework, were not likely to be predisposed to the adoption of ANIDS, since by its broad generalization and being aligned to the MDGs, it did not fit exactly into the extant models they were accustomed to. Naturally, they were apt to be concerned as to whether ANIDS would withstand rigorous of empirical inquiry as a sustainable development strategy. Part of the concern arose from ANIDS being seemingly a potpourri and omnibus mesh of idealistic aspirations, which once tied to the MDGs, provided a semblance of workability. The Eight MDGs and their respective targets were clear; and so too was the target date. The challenge was in the domestic operational content and modalities, and in enunciating the deliverables peculiar to particular states, which if accomplished would be in tandem with achieving the MDGs. Arriving at such an operational basis required experts doubling-down to produce a clear operational template, which ANIDS did not have.


12. Accordingly, what constituted measures that would help in alleviating poverty, became an open-ended policy matter, leaving room for assumptions and ad-hoc measures. In this particular context, ANIDS did not fit the bill or model applicable to understanding and tackling the basic causes of underdevelopment and poverty. Certainly, in the evaluation of Modernization theorists, and given the extant worldview then anchored primarily on the World Bank’s 1990 World Development Report, ANIDS as conceptualized and being implemented, was unlikely to provide robustly and efficaciously, the “three main requirement for poverty reduction – broad-based growth, human development and safety nets.” For instance, some of the envisaged empowerment programmes were reduced to intermittent conditional cash transfer (CCT) and skills acquisition programmes translated to supply of tradecraft tools- baking, hairdressing etc. In this context, it would seem that theory and practice of economic empowerment and poverty alleviation as well as the sustainability agenda would ab initio be at variance in the implementation of ANIDS. As the saying goes, “the devil will be in the details.” That was a challenge that would clearly manifest later on.


13. Anambra State also had a governance reputation challenge, which had created a new urgency for governance and developmental action. As noted, “Anambra State since its creation [has] experienced a chequered political history which disrupted the structure and functioning of the body politics and further hindered effective delivery of public goods and services, thus the state was battling to wriggle herself out of the intricate web of infrastructural decay.” Anambra State also belonged to the southeast geopolitical zone that faced some unique challenges. ANIDS was adopted at a juncture subsequent to the period when “the economy of Nigeria had all but collapsed. Worst hit was the South East, which had no influence whatsoever in the command post in Abuja. Existing health education, road and industrial infrastructure in Igbo states were gone.” Other challenges related to disjointed governance, with rising unemployment and infant mortality rate. Continuity in Governance (CiG), a prerequisite for sustainability of policies, infrastructure and resources, was also lacking, thanks to the extremely partisan nature of Nigerian politics. The negative impact was often more felt, where one administration is succeeded by leaders from a different party. Even that challenge was further compounded by the existing trust gap between leaders and the governed and more fervently by lethargy born of frustration and distrust on the part of the average citizen. As Wole Soyinka rightly observed, “the Nigerian citizen, as commentator, appeared to lack a sense of continuity over crucial issues – what had been done, what said, what response etc., as a basis of what is now being said, even if in contradiction.” Whereas, laying the blame on the citizens seems right, the corollary was that where citizens are not directly involved in contributing to policies that directly affect them, resignation and indifference will ensue. ANIDS would attempt to redress such governance anomaly, by having communities buy into and help shape public policies that affected them directly.


14. Still in 2008 Anambra’s fate and wellbeing could not be decoupled from the fate and wellbeing of corporate Nigeria. Social, economic and political indicators, required for determining a country close to becoming a failed state were all prevalent in Nigeria. Indeed, Google’s “Failed States Index 2008,” had ranked Nigeria 18th with eleven of the twenty states listed as the “worst” cases being in Africa. This led Prof. Ben Nwabueze to conclude that by its ranking “which is an incontrovertible evidence that a good many of the indicators or sign-posts are present in the country, Nigeria is definitely on the way to becoming a failed state, if it is not on the verge.” As Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala would later confirm about prevailing challenges of that period, “analysis showed that we would have to reach and sustain a minimum growth rate of 7 percent per year from 2007 to 2015 in order to succeed in cutting poverty in half – an objective we wanted to aim for in tandem with the internationally accepted U.N. Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Anything less would mean stagnation or a worsening of the incidence of poverty.”


15. Thus in choosing an alternative governance policy framework, it has become clear in retrospect, that Governor Peter Obi might have contrived a progressive leadership vision, in the mold of U.S. President Lyndon Johnson, by rededicating “himself to the values that had originally drawn him into public service: the idea that government should be used to help those who needed help – the poor, the uneducated, the ill-housed, the elderly and the sick.” After all, these were human and societal challenges the MDGs sought to address. Governor Peter Obi thus elected to think out of the box, certainly in two discernible spheres: confirming paradigms and ignoring anomalies, and secondly, by widening his vision and taking a global perspective of governance.


16. Coincidentally, Governor Peter Obi had campaigned for the governorship office with the mantra, “Is Anambra State Cursed or Are we the Cause?” The mantra resonated with the populace. On assuming office Governor Obi pursued that same line of logic in his policies and practices. What might have not been obvious then were the operational paradigms and inherent personal disposition, which are better understood by Robert Green’s declamation; that “in any field there are inevitable paradigms – accepted ways of explaining reality. This is necessary; without such paradigms we would not be able to make sense of the world. But sometimes these paradigms end up dominating our way of thinking… the things that do not fit the paradigms – the anomalies – tend to be ignored or explained away. In truth, anomalies themselves contain the richest information.” Evidently, Governor Peter Obi ignored the ways things were previously and routinely done in the governance of Anambra State, and instead, elected to look at the anomalies: Was Anambra challenges a “curse” or its people the “cause”? Getting Anambra stakeholders involved in governance matters offered them the unique reprieve opportunity to prove that it was neither “curse” nor “cause”; which left bad leadership and poor governance as the answer. Within the second sphere, Governor Peter Obi certainly opted for a global perspective. This approach can be validated by the observation that “in any competitive environment in which there are winners and losers, the person who has the wider, more global perspective will inevitably prevail.” The reason is simple: such a person will be able to think beyond the moment and control the overall dynamic through careful strategizing.”


17. In electing a totally foreign concept and framework, which was remarkably different from known governance styles and modalities that Anambra State civil servants were used to, and which would most likely also expose policymakers and executors to intrusive scrutiny of development partners, Governor Peter Obi altered the scheme of governance and the scope of deliverables. In their paper, titled “Why Do Policies Fail in Nigeria,” Australian public policy experts, Bolaji, Gray and Campbell, make two pertinent observations. The first is that “society requires the civil service not only to implement development goals and administer government policies on a daily basis, but also to play significant roles in formulating development strategies, policies and programmes that will stimulate accelerated social and economic change.” The second observation is that public policies are marred in many instances by poor implementation strategies, “because the civil service has a way of placing obstacles in the way of policies that are being formulated by political officials, especially for policies about which they hold divergent opinions or that are not of direct benefits to them.” As can be discerned clearly, in opting for the ANIDS framework, which sought to develop every segment of the State – 21 local government areas and 177 communities – simultaneously, Obi preempted any form of bureaucratic sabotage, while generally transcending definitional challenges of ‘development’ as “a concept that has defied a precise and consensus definition by development scholars.” Inherent in the integrated simultaneous development strategy, was the promise that no community will be left behind. This consequently ensured that civil servants and interest groups in Anambra were likely to push the development strategy programmes through, fully aware that with the common and simultaneous template and stakeholders’ participation in decision making, their advocated or preferred projects for their respective communities, would most likely come to fruition. It seems that Governor Peter Obi, evidently understood the need to demonstrate rather than explicate and in so doing “create a relationship of dependence” between the government and the governed.


18. The upshot of the pushing hard for the ANIDS framework, despite the awareness of the prevailing challenges and customary uncertainties that bedeviled policies and projects, was making the hardheaded decision between the easier choice of sticking with the “business as usual” and “that is not the way we do it here” mindset, and trying something new and revolutionary. Governor Peter Obi chose the latter by proceeding against all odds, with his vision of marrying MDGs to ANIDS to uplift Anambra state. The question that inevitably arose, was; Why?


ANIDS – why, when and by whom

19. What exactly it was that informed the decision of Governor Peter Obi to anchor his policies on MDGs are not so clear, but there are some evidentiary possibilities. The first is his rationalization, which will be touched upon later. The second is that Nigeria being a member of the U.N. in good standing and a participant in the adoption of the MDGs needed to give proactive effect to the framework by domesticating it fully or to the extent possible. And the third was that as a proactive leader, business executive and policymaker, Governor Peter Obi understood well prevalent challenges in policymaking and implementation. It has been contended that “there is no such thing as a bad public policy, since all public policies are supposedly well intended. Often what we confront are badly conceptualized policies, poorly articulated public policies and badly implemented public policies. When a desirable policy does not come to fruition, it becomes a failed or bad policy. In reality, however, quite often good public policies are undermined due to poor work or moral ethics.”


20. Another factor that may impact positively or negatively on public policy is institutional willpower. In this context, it has been observed that, “Although initiating public policy is sometimes a difficult task; the overriding challenge is the institutional willpower to see through the policy decision.” This is vitally important since “bureaucratic challenges- otherwise known as power of control, rhetoric without willpower and unethical behavior – limits [the] policy effectiveness.” Consequently, it follows that attentive and purposeful leaders understood that public policies tend to gain traction when there is clear ownership and institutional willpower to execute them. It could thus be argued that Governor Peter Obi perhaps understood the key variables required to make ANIDS a functional and implementable public policy framework, as well as possibilities of a higher success rate if tied to the MDGs, more so since the MDGs already possessed the institutional will power and collective imprimatur of the global collective, which imbued it with a near sacred policy authenticity, as the correct framework for any leader seized with serious development agenda to adopt. There was yet another perspective. It has been suggested that besides being “a development strategy, ANIDS was a well thought-out communication strategy.” Thus encapsulating the genesis, definition, and fundamentals of ANIDS, is a rather straight forward task, given the model’s simplicity and its eventual attested success.


21. Expatiating on the origin and tenets of ANIDS, is perhaps best left to its proponent, who rationalized his choice of the policy framework and rendered his imprimatur thus:  

I was sworn in on 17th March 2006, [but] my actual service to the State started in 2008. The 2008 budget was thus the first budget I presented to the House of Assembly as governor. It was based on the vision of achieving the Millennium Development Goals by the year 2015 as stipulated by the United Nations during the Millennium Development Summit in 2000. The strategy for achieving this was christened Anambra Integrated Development Strategy (ANIDS), which is a process for planning, budgeting, and implementing all sectors of the Millennium Development Goals simultaneously. Hence the budget of 2008 was tagged “Budget of Integrated Development,” which was principally anchored on the need to turn Anambra State around and commence visible and sustainable development that would permeate all sectors.

22. From the onset, the goal of ANIDS was to “pave the way towards economic self-sufficiency,” and “the beauty of ANIDS lies in its simultaneous development of all sectors.” With extant and competing models of democracy, conventional wisdom has always advocated the adoption of international best practices for service delivery, promoting human rights, for development and good governance. Within the context of democratic models, certain core values are assumed. “Mature democracies have a core set of values with wide appeal that define and justify political agendas.” However, it is worth noting, however that while some are gifted with leadership talents, others bring to public office and to leadership positions personal traits and experiences garnered from erstwhile engagements and learning. Governor Peter Obi’s choice to lead Anambra by design and to segue into development, economy and fiscal responsibility using the MDGs, was particularly remarkable. The disposition reflected his thinking and training as a businessman or as he would facetiously put it as “a trader.” It also affirmed his bona fides as a leader who could set priorities and focus on key tasks; after all, one of the most important tasks of a good leader is the ability to “deploy limited resources, especially of people and money into those areas where they can make the greatest contributions to the success of the enterprise.” More importantly, it was a pointer to Governor Obi constantly applying “the zero-based thinking principle to every cost and activity,” as he would in his private business. Invariably, aligning ANIDS to MDGS was meant primarily to pull in resources from the development partners, which he did successfully. Indeed, by 2013 Anambra State was pulling in over N1 billion annually in extra-budgetary funding from the development partners. Governor Peter Obi also spoke to two time-honoured observations; first, Barbara Castle’s postulation that “politics is as much about character as it is about the blueprint of policies,” and second, American Clergyman Phillips Brooks’ declamation that “character may be manifested in the great moments, but is made in the small ones.” Perhaps, it should go without saying that in choosing ANIDS, both the ‘character’ and the ‘policies’ were in tandem and having become fungible, the resultant governance outcomes were equally expected to be remarkable.

23. Why was there need for ANIDS, as an alternative governance policy framework in Anambra State? Beyond conjecture, seven answers are theoretically and normatively plausible and possible. First, was the desire to transcend the routine and normal, especially under the post-impeachment atmosphere in which Governor Peter Obi reassumed his office in 2008. Second, was the recognition that “policy encapsulates a government’s expressed intentions and official enactments, as well as its consistent patterns of activity and inactivity.” In this context, there was need to follow a clear, and identifiably unique policy trajectory. Third, is that “democratic governance is the most humanly friendly system of governance because it is designed to be responsive to the needs and aspirations of the people in an accountable way.” Fourth, in purposeful and transformational leadership, those leaders who are able to identify failed policies also tend to recognize early, the need for change in direction. Fifth, it has been adduced that “among the many variants of leadership, scholars have sought to identify two seemingly antithetical types—transactional, by far more common and transformational. Transactional leaders operate pragmatically. They appeal to self-interest of their followers, using quid pro quos, bargains, trades and rewards to solicit support and influence the behavior of their followers. Transformational leaders inspire followers to identify with something larger than themselves – the organization, the community, the region, the country – and finally to the more abstract identification with the ideals of the country.” Introducing a new concept and governance framework inevitably meant introducing and compelling changes in the extant “system.” But expectedly, putting the words “change” and “system” in the same sentence always translated to resistance, no matter how well intended. Indeed, as President John D. Mahama of Ghana once observed, “the system” is nothing more than a collection of people, their values and their behaviors. We are all part of a system, and all systems are subject to change. Change can be difficult, even for those who claim to want it.”   

24. Sixth, it has been suggested that “improving governance in government or in business must rest on several core principles: transparency, predictability, accountability, responsiveness and involvement of relevant stakeholders. What sets “governance in government” apart from “governance in business” are the norms of ethical conduct, the expectations of the people, the instruments of discipline, and the perception of credibility.” Some of these factors if not all, were seemingly embedded in the MDGs and were expected to be present in ANIDS by transference. This consideration is also in tandem with expert opinion that when smart reforms are introduced, they “will combine serious improvements in operational or working methods with some major policy and institutional changes.” Seventh, the conceptualization of the ANIDS governance policy framework coincided fortuitously with the earlier emergence of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which were universally accepted and adopted as the requisite parameters for entrenching good governance, alleviating poverty and promoting education and gender balance. Eight – a potential added value – was that once operational; ANIDS had the capacity trigger shared responsibility highlight commonality of interests by enhancing coordination between its state operators and the national and international interlocutors involved in bringing MDGs to fruition, especially in the area of marshalling much needed resources. This fostering of coalition of interests would also most likely incentivize projects and services recipient communities.


25. Several other critical variables were also at play. “The Anambra State Governor Peter Obi inherited was embroiled in political chicanery and banditry that resulted in damage of public offices, most of which were burnt and looted. Indeed, Anambra was considered a pariah state and no-go area for international development partners.” Additionally, Anambra State was a standalone state since it did not belong to the ruling national party, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). Governor Peter Obi also had to resort twice to the courts of law to reclaim his electoral mandate from the ruling party; and finally, there was a felt need to “maximize the benefits from very scarce resources because Anambra not being an oil producing state” then, was “a relatively poor state,” even though it has a slew of billionaires entrepreneurs. Moreover, it was widely known that Nigeria was no longer a priority foreign aid recipient. Indeed, at that juncture, “Nigeria received one of the lowest amounts of aid in the developing world: US$2 per capita per year, compared with US$28 per capita per year for sub-Saharan African countries.” Invariably, subscribing fully to the MDGs blueprint authored by countries of the development partners seemed a correct and direct way to lure in development partners and garner the much needed financial and material assistance they would readily dispense. To formalize that approach, albeit unilaterally, ANIDS was designed in essence and in nomenclature to mirror the eight goals of the MDGs, namely, to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal basic education; promote gender equality and empower women, reduce infant mortality, improve maternal health care; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability and develop a global partnership for development. In tandem with the wish to offer purposeful and transformational governance, achieving the MDGs became the main driver of all facets and principles of governance in Anambra State. The MDGs dovetailed into ANIDS and ANIDS piggybacked on the MDGs to deliver good governance.

 ANIDS ~ who were drivers, partners, and beneficiaries

 26. The efficacy of ANIDS could perhaps be traced to its multidimensional structure, replete with the drivers, the partners and the end-user beneficiaries. While the Anambra State Government teamed up with the key stakeholders including the churches to drive the process of addressing unmet needs in the education and health sectors, it drew enormous capacity-building strength from its unfettered partnership with the development partners. Indeed, it was well known that “there was also an extensive networking/interaction with Development Partner/Donor Agencies, particularly through the regular Development Partnership Review and Coordinating Meetings at the beginning, middle and end of every year – anchored by the Ministry of Economic Planning and Budget.” Likewise, the Government partnered with recipient/beneficiary communities in setting the agenda, in the needs assessment, budget formulations and consequently, in the programme and projects delivery. This process ensured ownership and obviated duplication and waste of resources. In some instances, the Anambra State government allowed the communities to determine and choose their end of year projects, which the government funded and the communities executed. To date, that policy format has continued in Anambra State under the Obiano Administration, albeit under a different nomenclature.  


27. During its life span, most attentive observers sought to understand fully why ANIDS was popular and getting rave reviews as a governance model. As it was then observed, ANIDS was “basically a strategy that allows that State Government to plan carefully, budget properly, implement the plan and monitor the implementation. Anambra State ensured delivery of the plan and encouraged participation and feedback from the communities and stakeholders for whom the various ANIDS project are being executed.” Prof. Chinyere Stella Okunna rendered the undergirding strength of ANIDS thus: “As a development initiative, ANIDS placed the people right at the centre of development as well as the centre of the robust development communication that was the driving force behind the strategy…there was, understandably, a great deal of stakeholder engagements by the government, as widespread participation and inclusiveness became the hallmark of governance.” With ANIDS, “Anambra State was among the very few sub-national governments in Africa that have adopted the MDGS as their Vision in their commitment to the development of their societies.”  


28. Coupling ANIDS with MDGs had a discernible positive effect; “because both the MDGs and ANIDS were grassroots-oriented, popular participation was necessary to make them work. Thus, at the heart of the participatory governance in Anambra State at that time was the involvement of the people in all stages of the development project cycles.” The trajectory of broad engagement with the beneficiaries of ANIDS programmes and projects was synoptically capture thus: 

Generally, town hall meetings and a variety of other interactive forums were a regular feature of governance and a major plank in the ANIDS development communication platform….the Governor met regularly with powerful stakeholders and opinion leaders like Traditional Rulers and Presidents-General of the Town Unions of all the communities…He equally interacted with the ‘powerless’ groups like primary, secondary and nursery school, children…The Governor also interacted frequently with youths in tertiary institutions…and gave voice to the ‘voiceless’ as typified by women at the grassroots…Tours of ANIDS projects were organized for all categories of Ndi Anambra and other stakeholders to see for themselves the development executed across the State;…the very many types of stakeholder engagement enabled the Governor to personally enlighten his people (young and old, and from all walks of life) about the policies and activities of his government, provide them opportunities to make inputs into governance, and personally ascertain their development problems and their suggestions about how to provide solutions to such problems.

ANIDS ~what were the deliverables

 29. ANIDS as a strategic policy framework had the totality of Anambra State as its remit; that is the people, the geopolitical space and the infrastructure. This in essence meant that the policy was targeted at the 21 local government areas, the 177 communities, and indeed, its conceptual and delivery clarity and efficacy was used to attract outside interlocutors, who would bring added positive value to Anambra State and the wellbeing of its populace. The upshot was that ANIDS was conceptualized as a grassroots-oriented pro-poor initiative, but its effective implementation eventually benefited everybody, including the ‘the rich’ and political opposition, who were impressed by ANIDS dividends, especially the undeniable and discernible network of roads and rural infrastructure.    


30. The impact and felt value of ANIDS rested on its core value and message: “ANIDS: Developing All Sectors Simultaneously,” and “No Community Left Behind.” The latter pertained to delivery of social amenities and services in the core areas of water and sanitation, healthcare, education, security and roads. As Professor Chinyere Stella Okunna indicated, “Ndi-Anambra fully understood the concept of ANIDS and its slogan (“ANIDS: Developing All Sectors Simultaneously”) was very popular all over the State during the Peter Obi years. To the layperson, it was the revolutionary development initiative put in place to improve their lives in every sector of the economy.” In the health sector, ANIDS stood to make a vast difference. As had been rationalized, “the MDGs are inter-dependent; all the MDGs influence health, and health influences all the MDGs. For example, better health enables children to learn and adults to earn. Gender equality is essential to the achievement of better health. Reducing poverty, hunger and environmental degradation positively influences, but also depends on, better health.” ANIDS also focused on poverty reduction with particular emphasis on assisting the unemployed, unskilled, needy, widows, and vulnerable children. Indeed, as recorded, “Between 2007 and 2010 a total of N49m ($313,600) was distributed to more than 10,000 women and widows to enable them to either start or expand their trading or farming business. Revolving loans worth over N330m ($2.1m) have been made available to 670 cooperatives across the state to facilitate the establishment of small-scale agro-based businesses such as poultry farms, fish ponds, pig farms, and cottage industries.”


31. ANIDS deliverables were broad and varied. From available documentation, six governance and development sectors, namely education, health, infrastructure, utilities, agriculture and security featured prominently and received considerable attention within the ANIDS framework. As Governor Obi personally and succinctly posited: “Our Government’s commitment to delivering quality education for the good people of Anambra State is total. That is why I have decided that our State shall henceforth be speaking only of acceptable global standards in education, instead of minimum standards.” Some of the ANIDS recorded sectoral deliverables are listed hereunder.


EDUCATION: Primary and Secondary Institutions and the entire education sector witnessed tremendous policy reform and transformation. The accomplishments included:

❖ Handover of all missionary secondary schools back to the churches;

❖ Construction of over 1,400 classroom blocks for primary schools;

❖ Rehabilitation of over 500 primary school classroom blocks;  

❖ Rehabilitation of over 100 sports fields;

❖ Provision of over 600 school buses to secondary schools;

❖ Rehabilitation of over 200 science laboratories;

❖ Provision of over 700 30 KVA generators sets to secondary schools;

❖ Provision of 400 fully equipped computer rooms with 10,000 computers;

❖ Over 150 Microsoft academies (50 laptops each) established at various schools;

❖ Hiring of over 200 qualified teachers;

❖ Development funding assistance of over N6 billion; and

❖ A 360 degree turnaround with Anambra State ranking in the ‘Top 3’ in secondary school certificate examination (SSCE) & NECO results from its previous ‘Bottom 5’ position some years earlier.


TERTIARY EDUCATION: The Obi administration invested over N10 billion in tertiary institutions during its tenure. These included:

❖ Construction of over 20 university hostels;

❖ Construction of an ultra modern Library, first in the State since 1966;

❖ Construction of 8 faculty and administrative buildings at Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu University (COOU), Uli campus;

❖ Construction of a brand new COOU campus at Igbariam (including roads, hostels, faculties);

❖ Construction of the Faculty of Agriculture (COOU, Igbariam);

❖ Construction of a 7km perimeter fence (COOU, Igbariam);

❖ Provision of over 400 computers fully equipped with internet;

❖ Construction of faculty and classroom buildings (COOU, Igbariam);

❖ Development financing assistance of over N5bn; and

❖ Construction of new administrative offices for Anambra State Universal Basic Education Board (ASUBEB), Primary School Service Commission (PSSC).


HEALTHCARE DELIVERY: : The Obi administration commitment to improving hospitals, healthcare education institutions and providing pertinent equipment was equally remarkable as the under listed health indicators reveal:

❖ Rehabilitated over 150 community health centres and general hospitals;  

❖ Construction of over 200 new primary health centres and general hospitals;

❖ Constructed over 50 brand new wards at various hospitals;

❖ Provision of over N4 billion in medical supplies and equipment;

❖ Purchase of over 100 ambulances;

❖ Over 5,000 health workers trained;

❖ Introduction of numerous medical missions from international institutions;

❖ Rehabilitation of over 15 specialized healthcare education institutions;

❖ Secured accreditation for the State’s School of Nursing, Midwifery and Health Technology;

❖ Built a world-class and accredited University Teaching Hospital in Amaku; and

❖ Built a brand new cardiac/kidney Dialysis Centre at General Hospital, Onitsha.


WORKS AND INFRASTRUCTURE: The Obi Government invested over N150 billion in roads and infrastructure, which conferred on Anambra State the status of having the best road network in the country, complete with roads, bridges and drainage systems. Projects completed include:

❖ Construction of over 800km of roads in rural and urban settlements;

❖ Continued and completed over 15 road projects from past administrations;

❖ Constructed over 10 bypasses connecting the old “Onitsha-Enugu” road to the new “Onitsha-Enugu” Expressway;

❖ The first government in the State to construct major roads in Anambra East, West, Awka North and Ogbaru local governments areas;  

❖ Established the Anambra State Road Maintenance Agency (ARMA);

❖ Over N5 billion spent on Rehabilitation of over 250km of roads; and

❖ Investing over N1 billion on heavy duty equipment


PUBLIC UTILITIES: The Obi administration excelled in the provision of basic public utilities, including:

❖ Construction of over 600 rural water projects (boreholes);

❖ Construction of over 300 boreholes in primary and secondary schools;  

❖ Construction of over 20 major water schemes and reticulation;

❖ Installation of reticulation pipes in over 40 communities;

❖ Procurement and installation of over 750 transformers;

❖ Completed 15 electrification projects; and

❖ Passage of State Water and Sanitation Bill.


AGRICULTURE: For the Obi administration, agriculture enjoyed a pride of place and was accorded high sectoral priority aimed at ensuring food security and employment for rural farmers. Tasks undertaken in this regards included:

❖ Putting up over N600 million through various counterpart funding schemes to ensure food security;

❖ Provision of N2 billion through commercial agric credit scheme to small scale farmers;

❖ Provision of over N1 billion in fertilizer subsidy for subsistence farmers;

❖ Purchased via PPP with a Belarusian Firm over 100 tractors and implements;

❖ Registered over 215,000 farmers through the FGN Growth Enhancement Scheme;

❖ Establishment of College of Agriculture, Mgbakwu (4 courses accredited);

❖ Distribution of yellow cassava to all farmers in the State; and

❖ Transfer of ownership of Omoh rice mill from Federal to State government;


SECURITY: The Obi administration achieved significant progress in crime reduction. Measures taken included:  

❖ Donation of over 300 patrol vehicles to security agencies(army, police, Navy, DSS, NSCD, etc.;

❖ Donation of over 500 communication equipment;

❖ Constituted the State Security Trust Fund;

❖ Renovated over 60 security agency quarters and stations;

❖ Donated 50 generators to security agencies;

❖ Donated Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC);

❖ Officially constituted Anambra State Vigilante Group (community police);

❖ Donated over 300 patrol vehicles to vigilante groups in all communities;

❖ Donated over N300 million to all communities for maintenance of vigilante vehicles; and

❖ Commencing the policy of legal demolishing private buildings used for kidnapping and other acts of criminality.


32. Despite the constitutional requirement on separation of Church and State, during Peter Obi’s tenure the Anambra State Government collaborated effectively with churches and other faith-based organizations in healthcare, education and social welfare. Using the ANIDS framework, the State on numerous occasions gave direct cash funding assistance to Catholic and Anglican Missions in support of their schools and hospitals. In public event in July 2013, Governor Obi “doled out N733 million to Catholic and Anglican churches to run schools handed back to them.” As was observed, “The church came into a kind of unique partnership with the government. There was massive renovation of schools and construction of new classrooms blocks in every Community which gave the facelift. The money was given directly to the Schools, which engendered honesty and competition.” How did this all happen? As recalled by Ambassador Dele Cole, “Against all odds and against the very real experience of government spending money on education with no results – pouring money into a black hole. He (Obi) called the missionaries and released N450 million to the Catholics, N350 million to the Anglicans and to his hapless Commissioner of Education he gave N250 million. There was a sea-change.”


33. Likewise Anambra State Government, which did not have a state police, used the ANIDS framework to enhance security by interfacing directly with federal security agencies and offering them direct logistical, communications and mobility support aimed at enhancing security and creating an enabling environment. In the latter part of 2011, “The Obi Administration launched a N4 billion Security Trust Fund, and also disbursed N354 million to ensure decent security and road maintenance. It was a Second State in the Federation, after Lagos to launch such a Fund.” As regards to social welfare and empowerment, following a methodical poverty mapping supported by DFID, which revealed that Anambra State’s most indigent person resided in Anyamelum, Anambra West, Orumba South, Awka North and Ogbaru local government areas, “In 2012, 2,250 persons from 25 communities of Anaocha, Anambra West, Ihiala, Ogbaru and Orumba South Local Government Areas benefitted from the MDGs Conditional Cash Transfer.” Despite these collaborative approaches being criticized in some quarters, they yielded short and long term dividends by way of qualitative education, social cohesion and enhanced state security.


ANIDS ~ what added value, testimonials, criticisms and praises

34. Like most countries and sub national governments in Africa, Anambra did not meet the MDGs target by the target date of 2015. The state, however, ranked higher than other Nigerian states with its level of deliverables in the eight MDGs categories. In consequence, with ANIDS the Peter Obi government clearly sought to and succeeded in delivering proactively, a holistic development pattern in Anambra State. Such added value was well recorded and borne out by testimonies rendered by the appreciative Anambra communities, the general populace, international development partners, academics and casual observers. As observed, “Mr. Peter Obi gave Education a pride of place as the foundation on which societies are built and quality of life defined. As part of efforts to stabilise basic education in the State, he took the momentous decision to return the management of erstwhile mission schools to their initial proprietors, which a cross-section of stakeholders sharply criticised then – mostly out of ignorance of the implementation strategy.” Additionally, “A World Bank study supervised by Professor Paul Collier of Oxford University, U.K. recommended the Anambra Model for the rest of Africa and other developing countries. On his part, renowned cleric, educationist, Rhodes Scholar and public affairs analyst, Catholic Bishop Matthew Hassan Kukah urged Nigerian Governments at all tiers to emulate what he termed the “Peter Obi Education Model.” In its 2014 Handover Report, the Transition Committee placed on record this summation of its work and evaluation of the state of the State; “in carrying out its work, the Committee was aware that a solid foundation and enabling environment were already in place, on which the incoming Administration could build on,” and further opined that its evaluation “pointed to discernible developments in most key sectors of the economy and in areas of governance.” It should also be underlined here, that “Anambra State was the first state to voluntarily subject itself to the State Peer Review Mechanism (SPRM); a point that speaks eloquently to her commitment to accountability and transparency.


35. Submitting public policies to external critique and evaluation is one of the core indicators of commitment to good governance. In evaluating any policy framework, testimonies by interlocutors who were closely aligned or supportive of the framework offer both critical and useful insights. After all, policy evaluation has been described as “The activity through which we develop an understanding of the merit, worth, and utility of a policy.” Moreover, “Evaluating a public policy consists of an in-depth analysis of one or more of these measures. The evaluation focuses on the effects produced by the measure, whether desired or not, direct or indirect, over the short or long-term. It may also concern the way in which the measure is implemented. In order to make a value judgment on its implementation or its effects, the evaluator relies on criteria such as effectiveness, relevance, fairness, sustainability, consistency, etc.” 


36. In that vein, ANIDS was open to various forms of evaluation. Understandably, Governor Peter Obi, his ANIDS vision and framework had their share of doubting Thomases and “even as noble as the intents were, the Governor’s critics scoffed at the thought he could effect progress in all sectors simultaneously in Anambra State – a State without oil resources; a State literally under the steel grips of brigands who had held the apparatuses of governance hostage. Many of his admirers also wondered if he was not going too far in blending dreams with reality.” But Governor Peter Obi and ANIDS also had some avowed and fervent believers. Such strong belief and support were amply reflected on the evaluation by a public commentator, Onukwuga Osuji, along these lines:

In its second term and some six years in office, the Obi administration has made tremendous impact on the polity, economy and society of the State with its ANIDS model. Across board, there are impressive and evidence-based outcomes with testimonials coming from the people whose welfare the purpose of governance is. First are heavy investments courtesy of institutional structures. These include instilling transparency in the management of public affairs, boosting confidence and efficiency in the three arms of governance [Executive, Legislature & Judiciary and their apparatuses]; strengthening the infrastructural base of the State [best and most extensive road network in the country today with over 500 kilometers of urban and rural roads majority of them with dual drainages, water schemes, waste and emergency management, generating master plans for three major cities [Awka, the state capital; Onitsha and Nnewi]; housing development; concrete support for primary, secondary and tertiary healthcare and educational services, and many others.


37. The commendations and validation of the efficacy of ANIDS did not end there. Onukogu Osuji affirmed his findings by undertaking a synoptic comparative assessment of Anambra State in pre-ANIDS and post-ANIDS periods, with specific focus on security and education.  

Anyone familiar with pre-2006 Anambra State would appreciate the steady return of peace and stability in the area. Today, citizen involvement is at the heart of community policing in the State. As far back as its first tenure, the administration was providing support to the Nigeria Police and Nigerian Army in the sums of N10 million and N15 million monthly, respectively…One of the unique aspects of the ANIDS model is that it cuts across public and private sectors. This has been especially telling in educational and health services. In the third week of November, 2011, the Government formally returned over 1,000 schools to their initial Missionary-owners. Beyond the hand-over, Government also committed solid financial support for the Missions to the tune of N6 billion, spread over 15 months and subject to satisfactory submission of work plans. Interestingly, Government will continue to cater for the schools’ staff salaries, while the Missions will be in charge of general administration.

38. A fundamental part of the entrenchment and legitimization of the ANIDS framework was the constant opening of the process and related activities to external scrutiny. One such visit took place Wednesday 15 August 2012, when DFID/SPARC seven-member team led by the National Programme Manager, Dr. Joe Abah held an exclusive consultative meeting with Governor Peter Obi at the Governor’s Lodge, Amawbia. Governor Obi was supported by Professor Stella Chinyere Okunna, the Chief of Staff and Hon. Commissioner for Economic Planning and Budget, Anambra State, and Mrs Vivian Nwandu, the Special Adviser on MDGs. Both were ranking state officials who were proactively involved in the framing of the ANIDS strategy and participated vigorously in its seamless execution and monitoring of compliance. The meeting was the second step in a negotiated action plan for documenting ANIDS framework trajectory. ‘The Governor and his team expounded the thinking behind the ANIDS concept and provided clarification in response to comments and questions from the SPARC team. The Governor also related emerging success stories (e.g. improvement in secondary school students’ performance in public examinations and refurbishment/re-accreditation of abandoned primary health care delivery institutions) from the novel governance approaches that have been adopted in the State.” 


39. In their post-visit evaluation, DFID/SPARC team reflected the following: “ANIDS represents Anambra State’s home grown strategy for achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). It currently exists as an unwritten concept for building confidence and legitimacy in governance, relying on aggressive consultation and novel participatory approaches to service delivery. It therefore needs to evolve from the abstract into a more concrete form – a dynamic results-based framework with strong monitoring and evaluation systems to guide integrated development in the State. It is against this backdrop that SPARC, as part of its inception activities in Anambra State, is supporting the documentation of ANIDS…The interaction provided invaluable insight into the expectations and thinking of the Anambra State Government and stands to enhance the prospect of very high political ownership of the ANIDS documentation process.”


40. Furthermore, this extensive introspective narrative also offered an unvarnished perspective on ANIDS:

Nigeria as a country did not achieve the MDGs. There was absolutely no way it would have done so. How, for instance, would the Education Goal be achieved with millions of children out of school, either begging in the streets or being married off at 12 years and even at 10? However, some states in Nigeria made valiant efforts to achieve the Goals. Anambra was one of them and did so well that Mr Peter Obi won an Award as ‘Best Governor in MDGs Implementation in Nigeria’, and was invited to the U.N. in September 2015 (when the MDGs were ending and when he was already out of government) to share his experience on how he achieved that feat. Virtually all the MDGs had practically been achieved under the MDGs-ANIDS framework. For Goal 1, a wide variety of poverty-reduction interventions were put in place after a carefully planned and executed “Poverty Mapping” (the first in Nigeria) to precisely determine the nature, causes and ‘location’ of poverty. Opening up the rural areas with good roads, particularly remote food producing areas did wonders for poverty reduction. Similarly, in a revolutionary partnership with the Church, the Education Goal was tackled with heart-warning results that impressed everyone, including our international development partners. The Health Goals were equally vigorously pursued in partnership with the Church, and also with marvelous results. As for Goal 8 on Partnership, Anambra excelled in that because all the Development Agencies that had previously deserted the state before the Peter Obi Administration came back and put their financial and other types of support to work for the development of the state. 


41. Quite often, government’s espoused efforts to create an enabling environment hardly go beyond clichés and sound bites. With ANIDS there seemed to be a concerted effort to support small and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs) and the organized private sector (OPS). The so-called Onitsha-Nnewi-Awka industrial axis (ONA Axis) benefited extensively from governmental support and collaboration within the ANIDS framework. As the 2012 Oxford Business Group report observed, “Various recently concluded partnership between the Anambra state government and foreign investors have boosted the state’s industrial base, creating jobs for the local population as well as contributing to the state’s export to the rest of the country.”In 2013, Anambra State government, in order to minimize loss of productivity and possible layoffs, assisted “25 industries at the Onitsha Harbour Industrial Estate affected by last year’s (2012) flood with N100 million to enable them pay wages of some of their staff.” To support local enterprise and reduce poverty by enhancing employment, the Anambra State government procured 177 vehicles for each of its 177 Traditional Rulers and “250 Patrol vehicles fitted with sophisticated gadgets” for the vigilante groups and markets in the 177 communities in Anambra State, from the Nnewi-based automobile manufacturing company, Innoson Vehicle Manufacturing Company. 


42. Furthermore, there remain an inextricable link between ANIDS as a governance tool and framework and the leadership traits of Governor Peter Obi, who conceptualized and utilized the strategy efficiently. In terms of comparative governance, it was asserted during Governor Obi’s tenure, that “the few Nigerian states currently evaluated as doing well are states where the governors have demonstrable policies linked to their personal vision.” Six years after Governor Obi left office, the following assessment was rendered of his vision, methodology and pragmatism – all variables that undergirded the utility of ANIDS. As Alex Otti surmised,

On Peter Obi, the truth is that he is a true example of excellent leadership and accountability in today’s world where such attributes are in very short supply….He improved the quality of education in the state to the extent that it came into strong reckoning as it ranked Number One both at NECO and WAEC for several years during his tenure. He returned missionary schools to their original owners and gave them financial support to run those schools. He built a University at Igbariam and built and equipped several hospitals. The state became “smaller” in terms of travel time as he connected most communities by building very good roads. He also understood that the only way to sustain the growth of the state was to support the private sector. ….He was therefore deliberate about what was important and what was not to his people. He focused on cutting drastically, the cost of governance. Amidst dwindling resources, many of our leaders do not realise that the cost of governance can be reduced quite significantly. This realisation and the resolve to implement it set Peter Obi apart from his peers. The history of governance in Nigeria shows that most of our leaders tend to continue to live a life of profligacy and extravagance, when, their states are insolvent and wallow in debt.

43. Another sphere where ANIDS seemed to have added value to good governance in Anambra State was in the realm of fiscal prudence and accountability that resulted in enormous financial savings for Anambra State. During the seven years the ANIDS framework was operational, there is no evidence available to prove that Anambra State ever adopted a zero-based budget. Yet, evidence abound that during that period, Anambra State garnered a lot savings due to fiscal prudence, results-based budgeting, curtailing duplication, waste and leakages. For such frugality Peter Obi was impeached. As variously noted, “Peter Obi did not commit any crime deserving removal from office but [that] his offence was his refusal to inflate the budget of the state.” Furthermore, Chief Stephen Okeke, a community leader in Anambra State, in a public testimony confirmed other reasons for Obi’s impeachment: “It was not just the request to inflate the budget and accommodate their interests, they also gave as reason, the use of N43.2 million by Mr. Peter Obi to repair the burnt Governor’s House for which N298 million was already appropriated in the budget; the use of N81 million for the reconstruction of the burnt Governor’s Lodge for which N486 million was also appropriated.” Of Obi’s offence, Mallam Shehu Garba, Media Assistant to President Muhammadu Buhari would aver in 2018; “His offence was that he refused to inflate the state’s budget.”   


44. Although the amount of savings Governor Obi was able to leave for Anambra State when he exited office on 17 March 2014, was consequently fraught with controversy, it is well documented and remembered that “In his End of Tenure Report Event, on 8th March 2014, which was well attended, and carried live on television, Gov. Obi announced that he was leaving in Anambra coffers some N75 billion in cash, investments and receivables.” This was further confirmed by Alex Otti’s insightful 8 June 2020, Op-ed titled, “The Triumph of Profligacy Over Prudence.” His exact words: “The question then is how did Peter Obi achieve that feat in a state that was reputed to have been owing civil servants and pensioners? How did he manage to clear all debts and leave funds for his successor? He had put on record the fact that he left a whopping N75 billion for the future generation of the state. Like yours truly had done in the past, one can attest to the fact that some $155million was invested in the tier two capital of three Nigerian banks with maturities of about 5 years at interest rates of up to 9% per annum to the credit of the State. As at the time the investments were made, the Naira equivalent of the funds was about N25b. If those funds were rolled over at maturity in 2019, they would be worth about N62b today. If interest is assumed to remain at 9% for the past 6 years, an additional N33.5b would have accrued to bring the present value of the investments to over N95b. This is one of the advantages of prudence and financial literacy.”


45. The validity of any policy framework rests on how rigorously it is assessed and even criticized. As such ANIDS had its critics, or those who held alternative views about its pertinence and efficacy as a governance framework. Some criticisms of the ANIDS framework were tangential and not related to programme substance, delivery, transparency or accountability. Yet as part of this policy model evaluation, such assessments are worthy of note. One study focused on ascertaining “The perception of the audience on the use of ANIDS billboards in showcasing social development projects by Anambra State Government.” The study while not discrediting the accomplishments of ANIDS, stated that its “findings suggests that 32 or 14.5% of the respondents said they read messages of government social development projects being showcased on the ANIDS billboard, 183 (83.2%) respondents said they do not read the messages, while 5 (2.3%) respondents can’t say.” Furthermore, “the analysis indicates that a significant 193(87.7%) respondents perceived the use of ANIDS billboard for showcasing governments social development projects by Anambra State government as a wasteful venture, 27 (12.3%) said it is not a wasteful venture.” The authors then suggested that “government should consider alternative means of showcasing its achievement rather than billboard medium as its cost so much to produce, thus government should convene a town hall meeting monthly to brief the people on its achievements strides.”


46. The ANIDS policy framework also had some trenchant critics, comprising of some policy theorists and academics, who explored its efficacy using comparative theories of ‘development’, but hardly any evaluations involving hard counts of where Anambra State was prior to ANIDS in terms of number of schools, healthcare facilities, immunized children, rural access roads built, employment, and those who acquired new skills. Rightly, some critics of ANIDS flagged that a key drawback of the framework was the absence of a precisely scripted template that delineated operational modalities, and more egregiously, the absence of formalized legislative backing that would ensure continuity in governance, in a post-Peter Obi era. The latter observation was valid; remains so and was indeed a grave oversight.


47. There were also other presumably flawed aspects of ANIDS cited by some appraisers that are noteworthy. Emma Chukwuemeka and Chukwujindu E. Chukwujindu, in their 2013 study, which evaluated ANIDS at its midpoint (2006-2011), using only empirical analysis of data, offered these three summary findings: (1) ANIDS has not been able to provide safe drinking water to the people of the state..; (2) Presence of ANIDS in Anambra has not shown in the health sector..; and (3) Evidence of poor condition of living still abound in the state. The standard of living has not improved; the streets are littered with refuse.” While the appraisal might have passed the litmus test of empirical research, the findings seemed to have failed in providing quantitative results of identifiable, verifiable, and quantifiable projects before and after the inception of ANIDS. For example, if youth unemployment in the state stood at 12% before the inception of ANIDS, did it drop to 7% or rise to 15% during the period under review? Did infant mortality rise or drop during ANIDS framework operational timeframe? Similar comparative evaluation of other sectors and variables were glaringly absent in the study.  


48. According to Chukwuemeka and Chukwujindu the authors of the study, “stratified sampling technique was adapted,” with a sample size of 400 persons in an estimated population of 5.8 million, which allowed for a margin of error of 5%? However, considering the prevalent level of literacy, relative to understanding the theoretical and practical concept of the MDGs and the ANIDS framework -which is quite unlike comparing the price of a bag of rice; comparing the price of widgets or the cost of transportation from point A to point B – it ought to be considered that those sampled, while living in Anambra, may not be members of the attentive public, as evidenced by the fact that some had decried the Government’s construction of “the multi-billion Stock Exchange Building in Onitsha” and “the building of Secretariats for Local Government Councils.” The failure of those sampled to grasp and consider these projects as possible building blocks and regenerative investments, speaks to the high possibility of their responses be skewed.


49. Whereas perception of improvement of social services or lack thereof emanating from the sampling could be accepted, alternatively, numerable tangible state infrastructure could have been quantified to determine their numerical increase or decrease, as the case may be. The number of educational, health and skills acquisition institutions and equipments provided under ANIDS, were also measurable as were the kilometers of roads constructed; while aggregated educational performance, were independently determined by the improved ranking of the State schools in WAEC, NECO and JAMB national examinations. The foregoing observation notwithstanding, the conclusions of the appraisal are pertinent, if for nothing else, for the benefit of policymakers and scholars who may wish to explore the ANIDS developmental framework as a model of governance or improve on its modalities. A synopsis of the findings of the appraisal was rendered thus:

 It has been observed from the findings above that the people of Anambra state have perceived some levels of inequity in the distribution of satisfaction from ANIDS, which ought to have been their own idea and version of NEEDs as well as a means to fast-track the realization of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the state. This condition can widen the gap between the people and the government because of the perceived irregularities, consequently the display of unpatriotic attitudes towards ANIDS and the government in general. ANIDS as a policy is too broad based to make any appreciable impact in the near future. It was also discovered that ANIDS lacks legislative backing. This means that the programme will inevitably die with the exit of the founder, Governor Peter Obi. To avert this, a legal instrument should be procured soonest. The intentions of the founder are plausible and altruistic but political influence is paramount in the implementation.


 As the study went on to conclude, “Effective implementation of a programme is key to the success of ANIDS. Nigeria’s experience has been one of formulating good plans and the failing to achieve objectives, because of the ineffective implementation or non-implementation. Implementing ANIDS calls for discipline, commitment and strong will to stir (sic) the reform from the Governor to the grassroots.” That said, from our perspective, we believe there are three important takeaways from these conclusions. First, lack of legislative backing may have resulted in the discontinuance of ANIDS by the succeeding Willie Obiano Administration. Even if the grounding ideas and framework of ANIDS had been institutionalized in the mindset of Anambra State civil servants from its inception, the absence of an enabling legislation has contributed to the lack of continuity-in-governance (CiG) and of sustainability of the framework. It remains plausible and also possible that the ANIDS ideas and methodologies are still being used in everyday governance of Anambra State, but that political expediency might require that such policies and methodologies are not publicly acknowledged or should be renamed. Such concerns inevitably have and will continue to raise obvious questions relating to possible policy shortsightedness or assumptions regarding the lacuna created by the lack of legislative backing for ANIDS. Why indeed was ANIDS not grounded by legislation? An insider very familiar with the ANIDS framework offered this insight: “That’s a question all members of Team Peter Obi should continue to ask themselves, including the Team Leader. However, sustainability strategies and legislative backing might have been overlooked by the Peter Obi Administration because everybody probably thought that a ‘friendly’, like-minded Administration would succeed the Peter Obi Administration and ‘Continuity’ would be ‘the Word’.”  


51. Second, as the study envisaged, it is equally safe to conclude that the ANIDS ideals and frameworks, inevitably died “with the exit of the founder, Governor Peter Obi.” Was this the case and if so why? Trying to decipher the exact cause has not been easy, but there may be certain plausible explanations, of which lack of continuity despite obvious succession planning, was a major problem. As such, it seems that only those in the post-Peter Obi Administration could answer that question affirmatively. Indeed, it would be recalled that Governor Willie Obiano had campaigned on the platform of ‘continuity.’ Also “When the government took off, Governor Obiano promised this state that he would complete Obi’s roads and commission them before starting his own projects.” This was a fact confirmed by Chief Lawrence Chinwuba, a senior official in the Obiano administration: “The mantra of our campaign was premised on four Cs [Continue, Complete, Comission and Commence new projects]. The first is continuity and that involved at that point, that the new governor, Willie Obiano, would complete projects started by his predecessor, Peter Obi. He would commission them and then he would commence his own.” There exist alternate viewpoints that relate to the vagaries of Nigerian bureaucratic politics. It has been suggested that “even if the Peter Obi Administration had put in place any sustainability measures, they could have been dismantled in a country like Nigeria. In fact, if the implementation of the MDGs had continued as vigorously as it was during the Peter Obi Administration, Anambra State would have fully achieved all the MDGs by the time the MDGs ended in 2015.”


52. Third and finally, the lack of legislation and proper documentation of ANIDS may have given rise to some residual resource ownership issues bordering on controversy. On this last point, questions have arisen, as to the ownership of the of Anambra Integrated Development Strategy (ANIDS) Transport Company, which in 2011, Governor Obi had acclaimed as exemplary, noting that “this organisation continues to tell success stories when you manage resources efficiently.” Due to lack of enabling legislation and dearth of requisite regulatory and operational documentation, it remains unclear, whether the ANIDS Transport Company, which is still operational, was franchised and outsourced as a public-private-partnership, or remained an entity within the Anambra State government. Another possibility was that the Anambra State Government might have loaned the use of its “ANIDS” brand name, to a private transportation company. In the absence of solid evidence, this prospect too, remains a matter of conjecture.   


53. It is noteworthy nonetheless that Anambra State Ministry of Road, Rail & Water Transportation listed as one of the accomplishments of the Obiano Administration, the completion of “Revamping of TRACAS (Transport Company of Anambra State) to house ANIDS, Mass Transit Scheme, Taxi Cab Scheme and Local Government Mass Transit Scheme.” However, barely one and a half years after Governor Peter Obi left office, an online report, made the following claims; “Information available to 247ureports.com obtained from competent sources indicate that the operators of the Anambra Mass Transit system [ANIDS] established during the Peter Obi administration, have begun converting the Anambra State owned vehicles to private vehicles – and selling them off at discount prices without the knowledge of the state government.” The veracity of the news report remains uncertain, since the Anambra State Government neither affirmed nor debunked the story. There has been no recorded evidence that Anambra State funds and resources were deployed in purchasing ANIDs transport vehicles. Thus the possibility of this being fake news also remains. What is pertinent, is that such narratives, which may well be politically motivated or a foray into fake news, are only made possible by the absence of an enabling ANIDS legislation, which would have clearly delineated the various sectors of the framework, sectoral resources, ownership and responsibilities as well as exclusionary and ouster clauses, if any.



54. The value and credence of ANIDS as a policy and development framework cannot be disputed. As other assessors of the framework rightly observed, “Across board, there are impressive and evidence-based outcomes with testimonies from the people whose lives these projects have touched. First are heavy investments to enable institutional structures. These include instilling transparency in the management of public affairs; boosting confidence and efficiency in the three arms of government (Executive, Legislature and Judiciary and their apparatuses) strengthening the infrastructural base of the country today with over 500 kilometers of urban and rural roads majority of them dual drainages, water schemes, waste and emergency management, generating Master Plans for three major cities (Awka, the capital, Onitsha and Nnewi), housing development, concrete support primary, secondary and tertiary healthcare and educational services, and many others.”

55. For our part, we believe that ANIDS worked for Anambra State to the extent that we can with audacity surmise that the ANIDS policy framework was efficacious not because it was a governance novelty, but because “he who frames first frames best.” If the ANIDS framework worked well in Anambra State, the reason is primarily multiple-tracked: first, there was buy-in and collective approach; second, there was unfettered transparency and accountability; and third, there was focused leadership in the public interest. This latter aspect has been validated thus; “leadership requires setting priorities and clear goals, transparency, good ethics, effective planning, organization and communication, and carrying along the entire constituency to accomplish target objectives efficiently. We must do so as a collaborative effort and with a clear sense of ownership, there must be synergy based on needs, input, and constructive criticisms from members of the local government. Even subordinates can influence policy and make novel constructive policy input.”


56. The question relative to ANIDS, which this assessment set out to address, remains unchanged. Can ANIDS serve as an optimal good governance model? We can answer that question in the affirmative, regardless of ANIDS evident shortcomings, which we have strenuously highlighted. We feel sufficiently on safe grounds, in concluding that ANIDS worked, despite being novel and despite not being grounded in legislation, because adaptive and transformational leadership, policy credibility, and seamless implementation of policies, programmes and projects in a transparent manner, and frugality made all the difference. More importantly, ANIDS worked because it drew its impetus from MDGs and thus provided clear and unambiguous institutional architecture and implementation modalities.  

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End Notes

1. Stephen D. Bolaji, Jan R. Gray, and Glenda Campbell–Evans, “Why do Policies Fail In Nigeria,” Journal of Education and Social Policy, Vol. 2 No. 5 November 2015, p.58

2. Chinyere Stella Okunna, “Development Communications in Governance of Nigeria: People At the Centre of Communication?” 43rd Inaugural Lecture, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Thursday 21 June, 2108, p.42.

3. Anambra State was declared Nigeria’s 10th oil producing state on 30 August 2012 by President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan. Yet in early 2020, when this assessment report was being finalized, Anambra State had not yet earned one naira or one dollar from oil production derivation.

4. Anambra State Government, “Unlocking Acess to Potential- The Face of Change,” 2007, p.5

5. Chinyere Stella Okunna, “Development Communications in Governance of Nigeria: People At the Centre of Communication?” Op. cit., p.42

6. Geoff Handley, Kate Higgins and Bhavna Sharma, with Kate Bird and Dianna Cammack, “Poverty and Poverty Reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview of the Issues,” Overseas Development Institute, London, Working Paper 299, January, 2009, p.12

7. Ibid.

8. “Anambra,” The Report, Nigeria 2012, Oxford Business Group, Report, p.277

9. Oseloka H. Obaze, Here To Serve, Speeches, Op-eds, Essays and Advocacy for Good Governance, (Albany, Ohio; Ben Bosah Books, 2016, p.21

10. “Anambra,” The Report, Nigeria 2012, Oxford Business Group, Report, Op. cit. p.277

11. Geoff Handley, Kate Higgins and Bhavna Sharma, with Kate Bird and Dianna Cammack, “Poverty and poverty reduction in sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview of the issues,” Op. cit., p. 29

12. Chukwuemeka and Chukwujindu E. Chukwujindu, “The Effect of Anambra Integrated Development Strategy (ANIDS) on Nigeria Sustainable Development: An Appraisal (2006-2001, European Journal of Business and Social Sciences, Vol. 2, No.9, December, 2013, p.100

13. Ibid. p.97

14. Chudi Offodile, The Politics of Biafra and The Future of Nigeria, (Ibadan: Safari Books Ltd., 2016, p.162

15. Wole Soyinka, Interventions -Between Defective Memory and Public The Lie- A Personal Odyssey in The Republic of Liars, (Ibadan: Bookcraft, 2015), p.131

16. Ben Nwabueze, My Life And Work In The Search For A New Better And United Nigeria – An Autobiography, Vol.3, (Ibadan; Gold Press Limited, 2014), p.326

17. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Reforming the Unreformable, Lesson from Nigeria, (Cambridge, MA; London, England: The MIT Press, 2012), p.15

18. Doris Kearns Goodwin, Leadership in Turbulent Times, (New York, London, Toronto, Sydney, and New Delhi: Simon and Schuster, 2018), p. 201

19. Robert Green, Mastery, (London: Viking, Penguin Books, 2012), p. 193

20. Ibid, p. 297

21. Ibid.

22. Stephen D. Bolaji, Jan R Gray, and Glenda Campbell–Evans, “Why do Policies Fail In Nigeria,” Op. cit. p.60

23. Ibid.

24. Chinyere Stella Okunna, “Development Communication In Governance In Nigeria: People At The Centre of Communication?”, Op. cit. p.6

25. Robert Green, The 48 laws of Power, (New York: Viking Penguin, 2000), p.85

26. Oseloka H. Obaze, Here To Serve, Speeches, Op-eds, Essays and Advocacy for Good Governance, Op. cit. p.18

27. Stephen D. Bolaji, Jan R Gray, and Glenda Campbell–Evans, “Why do Policies Fail In Nigeria,” Op cit., p.58

28. Ibid. p.62

29. Chinyere Stella Okunna, “Development Communication In Governance In Nigeria: People At The Centre of Communication?”, Op. cit. p.43

30. Peter Obi, “Is Anambra State Cursed or Are We the Cause?” End of Tenure Compendium, March 2104, p. 8

31. See “Anambra,” The Report, Nigeria 2012, Op.cit. p.276

32. Peter Obi, “Is Anambra State Cursed or Are We the Cause?” Op cit. p. 8

33. Valerie Braithwaite, “The Value Balance Model and Democratic Governance” Psychological Inquiry, Vol. 20, No. 2/3 (April-September 2009), pp. 87-97.

34. Brian Tracy, How the Best Leaders Lead, (New York, Atlanta, Brussels, Chicago, Mexico City, San Francisco, Shanghai, Tokyo, Toronto, Washington DC: American Management Association (AMACOM), 2010, p.6

35. Ibid. p.100

36. Phillip Brooks Quotes, https://goodreads.com/author/quotes/232518.Phillips_Brooks

37. Stephen D. Bolaji, Jan R. Gray, and Glenda Campbell–Evans, “Why do Policies Fail in Nigeria,” Op. cit., p.57

38. G. Shabbir Cheema and Linda Maguire, as quoted in Fostering Citizen-Government Collaboration, Lead Training Manual, Pillar Three, publication of Savannah Centre for Diplomacy, Democracy and Development, (SCDDD), 5/1//2018, p. vi

39. Doris Kearns Goodwin, Leadership in Turbulent Times, Op. cit., p.234-235

40. Chukwuemeka Bosah, (Ed), Celebrating Chinua Achebe, Essays On His Life, Legacy and Works, (New Albany, Ohio: Ben Bosah Books, 2013), p. 24

41. Oseloka H. Obaze, Here To Serve, Speeches, Op-eds, Essays and Advocacy for Good Governance, Op. cit., p. 19

42. Ejeviome Eloho Otobo, Consolidating Peace In Africa; The Role of the United Nations Peacebuilding Comission, (Princeton, NJ: AVM Publishing Services, 2015), p.7

43. Anambra State Government, “Unlocking Acess to Potential- The Face of Change,” 2007, p.9

44. Ibid.

45. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Reforming the Unreformable, Lesson from Nigeria, Op. cit., p.15

46. Chinyere Stella Okunna, “Development Communications in Governance of Nigeria: People At the Centre of Communication?” Op. cit., p.44.

47. Anambra State Government, “Unlocking Acess to Potential- The Face of Change,” Op Cit. p.9

48. Chinyere Stella Okunna, “Development Communications in Governance of Nigeria: People At the Centre of Communication?” Op. cit., p.44

49. Ibid.

50. Chinyere Stella Okunna, “Development Communications in Governance of Nigeria: People At the Centre of Communication?” Op. cit., p.43.

51. Ibid, pp.44-45

52. Chinyere Stella Okunna, Written interview/questionnaire response, 14 October, 2019.

53. See https://www.who.int/topics/millennium_development_goals/about/en/

54. See “Anambra,” The Report, Nigeria 2012, Op. cit., p.277

55. Onukwuga Osuji, “Anambra and it ANIDS Project,” The Vanguard, February 20, 2012, https://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/02/anambra-and-it-anids-project/

56. ANSG Internal Document titled, “Gov. Obi Administration’s Achievements (ANIDS), 2014.

57. Emmanuel Uzodinma, “Obi Donates N733 million to Mission Schools,” https://dailypost.ng/2013/07/02/governor-obi-donates-n733-million-to-mission-schools/

58. Jude Okafor, Uzodinma Okafor, & Ignatius I. Nguni, “Budgetary Allocation and Implementation of Anambra Integrated Development Strategy: A Discourse (2007-2013),” https://ssrn.com/abstract-3307568, Retrieved 1 June 2020 

59. Dele Cole, “Peter Obi, Ebola and The Missions,” Thisday, 14 December 2014.

60. Jude Okafor, Uzodinma Okafor, & Ignatius I. Nguni, “Budgetary Allocation and Implementation of Anambra Integrated Development Strategy: A Discourse (2007-2013),” Op. cit.

61. Ibid

62. See “Education: Obi’s Model Pays Off,”https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/08/education-obis-model-pays-off/ Retrieved 3 June 2020.  

63. Ibid.

64. See Anambra State Government Handover Report 2014, p.5

65. Oseloka H. Obaze, Here To Serve, Speeches, Op-eds, Essays and Advocacy for Good Governance, Op. Cit., p. 30

66. ”Brief 1: Overview of Policy Evaluation, https://www.cdc.gov/injury/pdfs/policy/brief%201-a.pdf, Retrieved 8 June 2020 

67. See “Evaluating a public policy”: what is the purpose?” http://statistics.brussels/publications/headings/in-the-spotlight/november-2017-evaluating-a-public-policy-what-is-the-purpose#.XuOJUcoo-hA, Retrieved 8 June 2020 

68. Onukwuga Osuji, “Anambra and Its ANIDS Project,” the Vanguard February 20, 2012, https://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/02/anambra-and-it-anids-project/

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. See “SPARC Visit to Anambra Governor,” http://www.sparc-nigeria.com/news.php pageNum_Recordset1=9&totalRows_Recordset1=29

72. Ibid.

73. Chinyere Stella Okunna, Written Interview/Questionnaire Response, 14 October, 2019.

74. “Anambra,” The Report, Nigeria 2012, Op. Cit., p.279 

75. Vincent Ujumadu, “Flood: Anambra to Assist Companies With N100m,” 

https://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/06/flood-anambra-to-assist-companies-with-n100m/, Retrieved 3 June 2020.

76. “Nigeria: Governor Obi Procures 250 Vehicles for Vigilante Groups” https://allafrica.com/stories/201307151061.html, Retrieved 3 June 2020.

77. Oseloka H. Obaze, Here To Serve, Speeches, Op-eds, Essays and Advocacy for Good Governance, Op. Cit., p.21

78. Alex Otti, “The Triumph of Profligacy Over Prudence,” https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2020/06/08/the-triumph-of-profligacy-over-prudence/, Retrieved 8 June 2020 

79. “Peter Obi Impeached for Refusing to Inflate Anambra Budget – Presidency,” https://theeagleonline.com.ng/peter-obi-was-impeached-for-refusing-to-inflate-anambra-budget-presidency/ Retrieved 8 June 2020  

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid.

82. Oseloka H. Obaze, Here To Serve, Speeches, Op-eds, Essays and Advocacy for Good Governance, Op. cit., p.238

83. Alex Otti, “The Triumph of Profligacy Over Prudence,” Op. cit.  

84. Daniel T. Ezeugwu, and Nwankwo Alfred Mbonu, “Audience Perception of the Use of Billboard in Showcasing Government’s Social Development Projects: A Study of Anambra State Integrated Development Strategy Billboard,” International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities Reviews Vol.4 No.1, May., 2013; p.197 – 210 (ISSN: 2276-8645)

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

87. Chukwuemeka and Chukwujindu E. Chukwujindu, “The Effect of Anambra Integrated Development Strategy (ANIDS) on Nigeria Sustainable Development: An Appraisal (2006-2001, European Journal of Business and Social Sciences, Vol. 2, No.9, December, 2013, p.111

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid, p. 111

90. Ibid. p. 112

91. Chinyere Stella Okunna, Written Interview/Questionnaire response, 14 October, 2019.

92. “Why There Has Been Constant Work on Awka Flyovers – Works Commissioner, “https://www.fidesnigeria.org/opinion/1486381275/why-there-has-been-constant-work-on-awka-flyovers-%E2%80%93-works-commissioner  

93. Ibid.

94. Chinyere Stella Okunna, Written Interview/Questionnaire Response, 14 October, 2019.

95. Chukwujekwu Ilozue “Nigeria: Obi Hails ANIDS Transport Firm,” https://allafrica.com/stories/201106170434.html, Retrieved 5 October, 2019.

96. See Anambra State Ministry of Road, Rail & Water Transportation, https://www.anambrastate.gov.ng/ministry/mort Retrieved 5 October 2019.

97. “Sabotaging Obiano: Peter Obi’s Associates Sell Off Anambra Transport [ANIDS] Vehicles,” https://247ureports.com/2015/08/sabotaging-obiano-peter-obis-associates-sell-off-anambra-transport-anids-vehicles/, Retrieved 5 October, 2019.

98. Jude Okafor, Uzodinma Okafor, & Ignatius I. Nguni, “Budgetary Allocation and Implementation of Anambra Integrated Development Strategy: A Discourse (2007-2013),” Op. cit.

99. Drew Weston, The Political Brain: Role of Emotion in Deciding Fate of the Nation, (New York: Public Affairs, 2007, p.87.

100. Oseloka H. Obaze, Here To Serve, Speeches, Op-eds, Essays and Advocacy for Good Governance, Op. Cit., p.66


Oseloka Obaze, MD & CEO

Oseloka Obaze, MD & CEO

Mr. Obaze is the former Secretary to the State Government of Anambra State, Nigeria from 2012 to 2015 - MD & CEO, Oseloka H. Obaze. Mr. Obaze also served as a former United Nations official, from 1991-2012, and as a former member of the Nigerian Diplomatic Service, from 1982-1991.

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